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“Prudential Discipline for Financial Firms: Micro, Macro,
and Market Structures.” Larry D. Wall, Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta Working Paper 2010-9, March 2010.
F
ederal Reserve economists have been busy dissecting
the 2007-08 financial crisis and evaluating various
reforms of market regulation. In this paper Larry Wall at
the Atlanta Fed discusses ways to strengthen market 
discipline at financial firms as well as revise government
supervision at both the firm level (microprudential) and
the market level (macroprudential). 
Wall argues that the owners and managers of a financial
firm won’t manage their risks prudently unless they bear the
costs of poor management practices. “If the government
bears most of the risk of loss, not only will the managers lack
adequate incentive to manage the risk,” he notes, “but the
government is likely to insist on playing a major role in the
firm’s risk management.” And regulators can’t observe or
second-guess every manager’s financial decisions.
Wall suggests that a microprudential supervisor should
regulate a broad spectrum of firms, which encourages infor-
mation sharing among supervisors of different sectors. As
for macroprudential supervisors, Wall says they should be
bold in their efforts to understand major threats to the
financial system, but modest in their ambitions. 
“Macroprudential supervisors cannot guarantee an end to
all financial instability, and trying to attain such a goal could
be worse than having no macroprudential supervisor,” 
Wall notes. Aiming to prevent all instability will create “an
incentive to severely limit the financial system’s capability to
innovate and to take risk.”
Wall does offer several options for mitigating the chances
of large losses turning into a full-blown crisis. A special 
resolution regime could help shut down insolvent firms that
are systemically important, thus avoiding the instability that
may result from a bankruptcy. Or, firms could be required to
develop their own resolution plan. Regulators could also
reduce the probability of failure by obtaining the commit-
ment of private investors to recapitalize failing firms.
“Financial Statistics for the United States and the Crisis:
What Did They Get Right, What Did They Miss, and How
Should They Change?” Matthew J. Eichner, Donald L. Kohn,
and Michael G. Palumbo, Federal Reserve Board Finance 
and Economics Discussion Series 2010-20, April 2010.
C
ould more and better data on risky mortgages and secu-
ritization have averted the financial crisis? Donald
Kohn, vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, and two deputy associate directors of the
Board’s research and statistics division evaluate the true
benefits of improved data collection in this paper. Their 
general conclusion is that, while gaps in data and analysis
prevented market participants and regulators from recog-
nizing the vulnerabilities building up in the financial system,
filling those gaps is only one step in developing an early
warning system.
“The information delivered by expanded and improved,
but essentially static, aggregate data can (and should) be
relied on for signals akin to grainy images captured by 
reconnaissance satellites,” the authors note. Such images 
are suggestive, but aren’t conclusive by themselves.
“Improved data collection can provide the greatest value by
highlighting changes and inconsistencies that bear further
investigation using other, more-focused tools mobilized to
deal with a particular anomaly.”
“Nonlinear Effects of School Quality on House Prices.”
Abbigail J. Chiodo, Rubén Hernández-Murillo, and Michael
T. Owyang, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
May/June 2010, vol. 92, no. 3, pp. 185-204.
T
he quality of a neighborhood’s schools is one of the
factors scrutinized by families during their house hunt.
So, it would be logical to expect that factor to be reflected
in home prices. Researchers at the St. Louis Fed argue that
these variables have a nonlinear relationship: The home
price premium grows as school quality increases.
For one thing, families who value education more than
others will compete with one another for homes in neigh-
borhoods with the highest-quality schools. Alternatively,
families may choose homeschooling or private schools to
give their children a better education if they live in lower-
quality school districts. Therefore, the quality of the
neighborhood public school is less important to them and
has less influence on home prices. 
The authors further hypothesize that school quality can
be considered a luxury good, so people in richer neighbor-
hoods will pay higher home prices for the same marginal
increase in school quality.
To test this effect, the paper’s authors used housing
prices, math test scores for the St. Louis metropolitan area,
and other data. “Unlike most studies in the literature, we
find that the price premium parents must pay to buy a house
in an area associated with a better school increases as school
quality increases,” the authors note. “We also find that the
racial composition of neighborhoods has a statistically 
significant effect on house prices.” RF
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